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VOTER RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS IN STATE AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS
In 1970, Ohio's voter residency laws withstood two constitutional chal-
lenges in the federal district courts.1  In Sirak v. Brown,2 the petitioner
moved to Columbus in January of 1970 and attempted to register as a voter
in Franklin County on May 19, 1970, so that she could vote in the fall
election on November 3. Her application was denied on the basis of her
not having resided in Ohio for one year. Thereafter, a complaint was
filed in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at-
tacking the residency requirement. The complaint was later dismissed
on the ground that no substantial federal question was raised, thereby
precluding the convening of a three judge court. This judgment was
appealed, but since argument was not set until after the election, counsel
moved the Supreme Court for a stay and temporary injunction of the
district court ruling, which was denied.3 After the election had passed,
petitioner moved for and was granted a remand to the district court with
order to vacate judgment and to enter judgment as moot. In Howe v.
Brown,4 the petitioner and his wife had not resided in Ohio for a year
before attempting to register to vote with the Cuyahoga County Board of
Elections. After denial of registration, a complaint was entered in the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio which convened
a three judge court to hear the merits of the constitutional challenge. The
court, one judge dissenting, upheld the validity of the one year durational
requirement. However, several other three judge courts confronting the
same issue on similar facts and law have reached contrary conclusions.
The rationale of the conflicting viewpoints is analyzed in this Note. After
discussion of the traditional concept of voter residency qualifications, at-
tention is focused upon the rationale that appears to be a trend under-
mining the state's power to restrict voting rights. Thereafter, the extent
to which voter residency laws infringe upon the right to travel is examined.
1 OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (1923):
Every citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have
been a resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county, town-
ship, or ward, in which he resides, such time as may be provided by law, shall have the
qualifications of an elector, and be entitled to vote at all elections.
Ohio voters on November 3, 1970 amended the above provision so that the existing residency
requirement is six months rather than one year.
OHIO REv. CODE § 3503.01 (Page 1953), in pertinent part provides:
Every citizen of the United States who is of the age of twenty-one years or over
and who have been a resident of the state one year, of the county forty days, and of the
voting precinct forty days next preceding the election at which he offers to vote has the
qualifications of an elector and may vote at all elections....
2 Civil No. 70-164 (S.D. Ohio, July 10, 1970), motion to vacate and cause remanded to
dismiss as moot granted, No. 20,753 (6th Cir., Dec. 10, 1970).
3 400 U.S. 809 (1970).
4 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
I. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT VIEWED
AS A STATE'S RIGHT
A traditional approach to examine state voter residency qualifications
initially focuses on Pope v. Williams.5  In this case the petitioner changed
his residence from Washington, D.C., to Maryland where the state con-
stitution and election statutes required new residents to register their in-
tent to reside in Maryland one year prior to becoming qualified electors.'
Although the petitioner had resided in Maryland over a year before at-
tempting to register to vote in state elections, he was denied registration
for failure to register his intentions.7  The statute was then challenged on
three grounds: 1) the privilege and immunities clause, 2) the equal protec-
tion clause, and 3) the right to interstate movement. In upholding the
Maryland statute the Court said:
The privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Consti-
tution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from
citizenship of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. It
may not be refused on account of race, color or previous condition of servi-
tude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States.
In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of
the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such
terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is
made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution.8
In addition, the Court stated that there was no federal question involved in
determining the reasonableness of residency conditions:
The question whether the conditions prescribed by the State might be re-
garded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one. We
do not wish to be understood, however, as intimating that the condition
in this statute is unreasonable or in any way improper.9
The right to vote in state elections was not an unqualified privilege or
immunity of the United States, but rather was a privilege granted from
the reserved powers of the several states. Therefore, if state voter resi
dency laws fail, there would appear to be a modification in state and fed-
eral powers.
Later case decisions cite the reasoning of Pope with approval and af-
firm the proposition that states are within their power to impose condi,
r 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
6 MD. CODE art. 33, § 25B (1902).
7 This case has been widely stated as upholding the one year durational residency require-
ment of Maryland, however, that issue was not before the court. The only issue to be decided
was whether Maryland had the legal right to require a new resident to declare his intent of res-
idency a year before should have the right to be registered as a voter. See 193 U.S. at 632.
8 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
OId. at 633.
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tions on citizens before they qualify as electors. In Lassiter v. Northamp-
ton Election Bd.10 the Court said:
The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335, ab-
sent of course 'the discrimination which the Constitution condemns ...
... We do not suggest any standards which a State desires to adopt may
be required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its juris-
diction. Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious
examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in
determining the qualifications of voters.'"
Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash'2 the Court stated:
Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence restric-
tions on the availability of the ballot. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621.
There can be no doubt either of the historic function of the States to es-
tablish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Consti-
tution, other qualifications for the exercise of the franchise.' 3
However, the most significant support of the traditional point of view
is Dreuding v. Devlin,'4 in which a three judge district court upheld Mary-
land's requirement of one year residency within the state and six months
residency within the county before one could qualify to vote for presiden-
tial and vice presidential electors.' 5 This decision is significant for two
reasons. First, the court does not strictly adhere to the Pope rationale
which said the reasonableness of the state qualification was not a federal
question, but rather the three judge court asked whether the residency
requirements were so unreasonable as to amount to a prohibited discrimi-
nation. To test the reasonableness under the equal protection clause, the
court applied the common test as stated in McGowan v. Maryland:'6
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's ob-
jective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their con-
stitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'7
1o 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
1Id. at 50-51 (citation omitted).
12380 U.S. 89 (1965).
131d. at 91.
14234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
'5 234 F. Supp. at 722 n.1.
16366 U.S. 420 (1961).
171d. at 425-26 (citations and footnote omitted).
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Also significant is the fact that the court rejected the petitioner's argu-
ment that this voter qualification issue is analogous to the reapportionment
and redistricting cases of Wesberry v. Sanders" and Reynolds v. Sims 9
in which the Supreme Court spoke of suffrage as a fundamental right and
subjected suffrage impediments to the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The
Dreuding court made no attempt to distinguish these cases when rejecting
this reasoning. Apparently, the court felt that a state voter qualification
such as residency was to be tested by a different standard than lines drawn
by legislators dividing the population. The silence of the court might
also suggest that the court was protecting a right of the state, and that
these cases raised too stringent a standard for residency laws to be upheld.
The district courts of Ohio followed the traditional point of view on
residency qualifications as stated in Pope and Dreuding. In Howe v.
Brown2' the court recognized the existence of two standards to measure
state legislative action: 1) the rational relation test, and 2) the compelling
state interest test. The court noted that the latter test had been used by the
Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,22 McLaughlin v. Florida,23 and
Korematsu v. United States-" which all concerned infringement of a con-
stitutional right. The test looks to see if the classification is necessary to
promote an articulated state interest, and whether the articulated interest
is compelling for the state. ,However, the court rejected this equal pro-
tection standard by returning to the state's right view of Pope in order to
conclude that there is no constitutional right to vote in a state election and
that the "rational" standard had been applied to such conditions as age,
literacy, -5 criminal record,26 United States citizenship, and residency.2 The
basis for applying this test has been that the states did not surrender to
the federal government the power to determine who is qualified to vote
in state and local elections. The court concluded:
Since no one has the federal constitutional right to vote in State and local
elections, the state may create reasonable nondiscriminatory classifications
of those to whom it will grant the franchise. Since reasonable conditions
of suffrage do not impinge upon a federal constitutional right to vote in
18 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
10 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2 0 See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
21319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
22 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
23 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
24323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
2 GSee, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959);
but see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding Title H of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 prohibiting the use of any test or device resembling a literacy test in any
national, state, or local election that discriminates on a basis of race).
20 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
2 7 See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Dreuding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721
(D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
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state and local elections, the "rational relation" test has consistently been
applied.2 8
The court found that Ohio had several interests that are promoted by the
one year residency requirement: 1) ensuring that those who vote for state
and local representatives are familiar with the political candidates and is-
sues by having been given maximum exposure to the problems of the lo-
cality through the media of local communication, 2) preventing individ-
uals, motivated only by a desire to affect the state's election results, from
"moving' into the state shortly before the election was held, voting, and
then returning to their foreign domicile; 3) ensuring that the electors have
genuine interests in the community. 9
The rationale of Dreuding was also accepted by classifying voting rights
cases so that the compelling state interest test would only apply to particu-
lar voting restrictions. The court said:
Until the Supreme Court sees the need to apply the "compelling state in-
terest" test in all voting rights cases, or applies it across the board in equal
protection cases, it is not within this Court's province to declare every in-
equality, every inconvenience, every burden a state places upon one class
of citizens and not on another and every distinction created by legislatures
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.30
In Sirak v. Brown,31 the court was persuaded by the same arguments
and refused to convene a three judge court. In the memorandum sup-
porting the motion to dismiss the complaint, counsel for defendants con-
tended that no substantial federal question was presented since Pope v.
Williams" had not been overruled, and, in fact, has been cited with ap-
proval in Dreuding v. Devlin,33 Carrington v. Rash,34 and Hall v. Beals.8 5
The district court felt "bound by the rule of law established in Pope" which
was the underlying basis of Dreuding.3 6 The court concluded:
Thus the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that State
voter residency requirements are constitutional. In light of these decisions,
the Court holds that plaintiff's motion to convene a Three Judge Court is
without merit, and therefore it is DENIED. Cf., Sola v. Sanchez Vilella,
23 319 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
291d. at 866.
301 d. at 869.
31 Civil No. 70-164 (S.D. Ohio, July 10, 1970), motion to vacate and cause remanded to
dismiss as moot granted, No. 20,753 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1970).
32 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
8 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per cauriam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
84 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
35 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), appeal dismissed as moot, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (chal-
lenge to the Colorado six month residency requirement).
36 Civil No. 70-164,2 (N.D. Ohio, July 10, 1970).
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270 F. Supp. 459, 464 (D. Puerto Rico 1967), aff'd. 390 F.2d 160 (ist
Cir. 1968).37
It is interesting to note that this was the only district court in 1970 that
refused to grant a three judge court to listen to the merits of a challenge
to residency qualifications. It is difficult to determine how the court con-
cluded that the issue was so conclusively resolved in light of the fact that
prior three judge courts had been convened to hear similar issues 8 and that
recent Supreme Court decisions suggested a new approach to examine vot-
ing right restrictions3 9 Furthermore, at the time of this decision two other
districts had convened three judge courts to listen to the merits of the
issue.4
The validity of state residency qualifications has also been sustained in
other federal districts. In Cocanower v. Marston,41 the petitioner attacked
the one year residency law of Arizona on several grounds, one of which
was the equal protection clause. The argument was based on the use of
the compelling state interest test which was rejected by the court since the
Supreme Court had only applied that test to "special purpose election
cases." -4 2  The court found assurance in Pope and Dreuding to apply the
rational purpose test to the state interests of 1) identification of the voter
and protection against fraud, and 2) insurance that the voter is a part
of the community and has a legitimate interest in its government.
Illinois also endured an attack on a one year state and ninety day
county residency requirement in Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners.4 3 The Supreme Court cases applying the compelling state interest
test were distinguished on the basis that in those cases qualified citizens
were withdrawn from the electorate because of the way they would vote.
Although the court took notice of an "impressive line of authority," the
reasonableness test was used on the basis of the Pope opinion.4" How-
ever, several other district courts have adopted a new rationale on which
voter residency requirements have been held to be unconstitutional.45
37 Id.
3 8 In Dreuding v. Devlin and Hall v. Beals three judge courts were convened to hear the
challenge on residency laws pertaining to federal elections.
39 See text accompanying notes 50-59 infra.
4 0 See Burg v. Canniffee, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal dopketed, 39 U.S.L.W.
3168 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970) (No. 811) (one year residency requirement); Blumstein v. Ellington,
39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), jurisdiction noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1971)
(No. 769) (one year residency requirement).
41318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970).
421d. at 404.
43 39 U.S.L.W. 2356 (N.D. IMI. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 12,
1971) (No. 1344).
44 Id.
45See Lester v. Bd. Educ. for Dist. Col. 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos,
320 F. Supp. 107 (MD. Ala. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3282 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1970)
(No. 1139) (six month county and three month precinct residency requirements); Affeldt v.
Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ind. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Dec.
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
II. UNDERMINING OF THE STATE'S RIGHT VIEW'POINT
There is no doubt that the challenger of a voter qualification law such
as residency has an uphill battle to wage since Pope v. Williams and
Dreuding v. Devlin47 have not been explicitly overruled. However, the
voting rights cases and equal protection cases of the last decade have pro-
vided a new rationale which tends to implicitly overrule the rationale of
Pope and Dreuding. First, the right to vote in national as well as state
elections appears to be elevated to a level comparable to first amendment
freedoms. Also, the Supreme Court has been more willing to scrutinize
state restrictions under the fourteenth amendment. Finally, since Shapiro
v. Thompson,48 durational residency laws are becoming suspect in protect-
ing state interests 9
The voting rights cases during the last decade stress the importance and
sanctity of the right to vote. Such a notion is founded on the basis that
suffrage preserves our other liberties. This is not a novel idea within the
suffrage realm since it was first expressed by Justice Matthews in Yick Wo
V. Hopkins,50 when he stated that "[political suffrage) is regarded as a
fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."'" This
concept has been adopted and expanded in many of the landmark voting
decisions in the 1960's. In Reynolds v. Sims52 Chief Justice Warren said:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. ,Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and po-
litical rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully ajid meticulously scrutinized.53
Justice Black had expressed a similar view in Wesberry v. Sanders,64 when
he praised the right of suffrage:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
10, 1970) (No. 1081) (six month residency requirement); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843
(E. D. Va. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal docketed, 39
U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S. Oct 6, 1970) (No. 811) (one year residency requirement); Blumstein
v. Ellington, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), jurisdiction noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1971) (No. 76,9) (one year residency requirement); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246
(D. Vt. 1970); appea docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1971) (No. 1336) (one
year residency requirement).
46 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
47 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), affJd per curium, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
48 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
49 See, e.g., Webster v. Wofford, 39 U.S.L.W. 2382 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (one year residency re-
quirement for admission to the bar invalid using compelling state interest test).
50 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51Id. at 370.
52 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53 Id. at 561-2.
54 376 U.S. 1, (1964).
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we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
to vote is undermined.15
In conjunction with these exalations of suffrage, it is apparent that the
Supreme Court has been eager to protect this right evidenced by the list
of decisions voiding state restrictions that failed to achieve an equality of
votes cast in state and federal elections."
However, the Dreuding court dismissed Reynolds and Wesberry as in-
applicable to the facts of that case apparently because they were not con-
cerned with voter qualifications, but rather were directed at redistricting
and reapportionment respectively. But, the new approach taken by the
Supreme Court seems to indicate that there is no classification of the char-
acter of the restriction. There has developed a blanket right to vote, and
any restrictions or debasement of the right are subject to the same standard.
The Supreme Court appears to have dropped the classification of voting
cases in Carrington v. Rash57 when subjecting a Texas voter qualification
statute to the equal protection clause. This was the first case to do so, as
noted by Justice Harlan in his dissent:
Anyone not familiar with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the history of that Amendment, and the decisions of the Court in this
constitutional area, would gather from today's opinion that it is an estab-
lished constitutional tenet that state laws governing the qualifications of
voters are subject to the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet
any dispassionate survey of the past will reveal that the present decision
is the first to so hold.5s
Therefore, it is very arguable that the voting rights cases of the last decade,
whether concerned with residency restrictions or not, influence and implic-
itly undermine the rationale of the Pope and Dreuding decisions."
Since it is apparent that the right to vote has become more precious
under our system of government, it is logical that the standard for protec-
tion of that right also has become more stringent. In explaining the ap-
SGId. at 17.
56See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (Texas law precluding members of the
Armed Forces residing in Texas from voting in state elections); Kraemer v. Union Free School
Disr., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (law restricting the right to vote in certain school board elections to
owners and lessees of real property and parents); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969) (state law restricting to property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve issuance of
revenue bonds); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (application of state law denying the
vote to those living on a federal reservation within the state); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
399 U.S. 204 (1970) (state law restricting to real property taxpayers the vote in elections to ap-
prove issuance of general obligation bonds).
57 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
1 Id. at 97. However, since Dreuding was affirmed by the Supreme Court, it would only
be logical to assume it was the first case that subjected voter qualifications to the fourteenth
amendment.
59 See note 56 supra.
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plication of the equal protection clause to the realm of voting cases,
Justice Douglas stated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections:6
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political the-
ory of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality,
any more than we have restricted due process to a xfied catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. (cita-
tions omitted). Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change.61
As discussed above, the common equal protection standard has been the
rational relation test, however, the Supreme Court has also used a com-
pelling interest test.2 This is a more stringent standard which has been
applied to classifications which infringe on a citizen's constitutional rights.
One of the first applications of this standard was in Korematsu v. United
States,63 when a federal legislative classification was based on race, and
more recently in McLaughlin v. Florida," where a racial classification was
embodied in a state criminal statute.
Although the Supreme Court opinions are not clear on this issue, it
does appear that a compelling interest test has been applied to voting cases.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,65 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the language of Reynolds v. Sims66 that "any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."' 7
In Harper, the Court struck down a state voting law requiring a poll tax to
be paid before qualifying as an elector. In Kraemer v. Union School Dis-
trict No. 15,08 the Supreme Court explicitly applied the compelling interest
standard when it voided a New York law restricting the right to vote in
school district elections to property owners or lease holders of taxable
property or those who have children in school:
[Ilf a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide
residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others,
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest. See Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 96.69
This rationale has also been expressed by Justice Marshall in his dissent
60 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
61 Id. at 669.
62 See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
63 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
64 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). For other cases using the compelling interest test, see Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
65 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
66 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67 383 U.S. at 667, citing 337 U.S. at 561-2.
68 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
69 Id. at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
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in Hall v. Beals.70  The majority of the Court refused to reach the merits
of the challenge to the six month residency requirement under a Colorado
statute pertaining to presidential and vice presidential elections, since
Colorado had in the interim between the decision and appeal reduced its
qualification to two months. Marshall felt that the Court should not have
vacated judgment and dismissed the case as most moot since the issue was
one likely to reoccur. Furthermore, he felt that such action would be
misleading to the lower courts since "Dreuding is not good law today.' '17
In support of this contention he stated:
But if it was not dear in 1965 it is dear now that once a State has deter-
mined that a decision is to be made by popular vote, it may exclude per-
sons from the franchise only upon a showing of a compelling interest,
and even then only when the exclusion is the least restrictive method of
achieving a desired purpose. 72
If this evidence is not sufficiently convincing, the compelling state interest
test was used to strike down selective distribution of the franchise in two
cases during 1970: Evans v. Cornman73 and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziej-
ski."4 Therefore, under the new rationale the stricter standard of compel-
ling interest must be applied to state classifications that infringe upon the
right to vote.
There can be no doubt that Shapiro v. Thompson75 had a catalytic effect
on the challenging of residency requirements in several cases including vot-
ing. In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated Connecticut's, Pennsyl-
vania's, and Washington, D. C.'s statutes which required a person to reside
in the state for one year before welfare could be received. The Court
determined that such a requirement penalized and restricted a citizen from
exercising his right to move interstate, and applied the compelling interest
test to the interests advanced by Louisiana for maintaining the require-
ment, but found to the contrary that none of the interests promoted were
compelling. The Court attempted to limit the scope of the opinion by us-
ing a footnote which said the court expressed no view as to residency re-
quirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free educa-
tion, to obtain a license to practice a profession,76 or to hunt and fish; but
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting, could not "understand the Court's impli-
cation.., that other state residency requirements such as those employed
in determining eligibility to vote do not present constitutional questions.
77
70396 U.S. 45 (1969).
71Id. at 52.
721d. (citations omitted).
73398 U.s. 419 (1970) (right to vote denied to residents of federal enclaves).
74399 U.S. 204 (1970) (right to vote in bond issue denied to nonowners of real property).
75 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
70 Sec note 49 supra.
77 394 U.S. 618, 654 (1969).
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Therefore, with this major attack on the state's interests underlying
residency requirements, there could be no doubt that residency require-
ments restricting suffrage would become suspect.
As stated before, the two Ohio decisions followed the traditional or
state's right approach to state residency laws; however, the recent Supreme
Court approach was also discussed. Counsel for Mrs. Sirak argued, in
brief, the reasoning of these cases, and one judge dissented on a similar
rationale in Howe. Furthermore, the majority of that court undertook
to distinguish the recent Supreme Court decisions.
The argument presented in Sirak was similar to Justice Marshall's dis-
sent in Hall v. Beals" s Counsel contended that the recent Supreme Court
decisions of Kraemer and Shapiro undermined the rational relation test and
supplanted a compelling state interest test. Similar to the Evans v. Cor-
nan9 situation, where Maryland maintained political control over the resi-
dents of federal enclaves but denied them the right to vote, Ohio also de-
nied the right to vote to a class of citizens subject to Ohio's laws. This
was claimed to be a "fencing out" process which was said to exist in
Carrington v. Rash 0 and therefore invalid.
After concluding that the compelling state interest test was to be ap-
plied to residency requirements, since they infringe upon the fundamental
right to vote, counsel examined the state interests in light of the standard.
One possible interest of the state was to protect itself from fraudulent
declarations of citizenship. However, counsel noted the rejection of this
contention by Justice Marshall since it created a conclusive presumption of
nonresidency. Citing Shapiro, counsel noted that the real issues to be
determined are whether a person is a resident and whether he intends to
remain a resident, not how long a person has resided in the state. A flat
durational requirement is overly broad and it would be possible to achieve
the interest by a narrower restriction. Administrative simplicity was also
examined as a state interest, but on the basis of Carrington this interest
has been rejected. Furthermore, forty days has been determined as ad-
ministratively feasible to handle registration of voters before a presidential
election. Counsel also used the fact of the proposed constitutional amend-
ment to reduce the residency requirement to six months as evidence that
Ohio had no interest whatsoever in a one year duration. A third state
interest might be the state's concern of new residents' familiarity of local
issues, however, counsel phrased the interest as to "how the recent citizen
may vote."81 In Carrington the Supreme Court rejected the contention
that how servicemen might vote was a valid basis for voting restrictions.
The Howe court believed that there has been no change in the state-
78 396 U.s. 45 (1969).
79 398 U.s. 419 (1970).
80 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
81 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Sirak v. Brown, Civil No. 70-164 (S.D. Ohio, July 10, 1970).
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federal relationship even after the series of voting cases beginning with
Kraemer, and that the contrary opinions in other district courts, Blumstein
v. Ellington82 and Burg v. Canniffee, were in error. This court read the
recent Supreme Court decisions in a different light:
Kraemer and its progeny stand for the following proposition: Persons
who qualify under a state's valid election laws (by meeting its conditions
of suffrage, i.e., age, residency, and citizenship requirements) have a con-
stitutional right to vote in all state and local elections in which they have an
interest. No state legislation or constitution may impinge upon this consti-
tutional right to vote once qualified by "selectively excluding" a class of
otherwise qualified electors from voting in any election in which they have
an interest, unless the "compelling state interest" test is satisfied; that is,
the classification of otherwise qualified voters excluded must be "neces-
sary" to promote a "compelling state interest."8'
Therefore, the court reasoned that the compelling state interest test was
applied in situations not present on the facts, such as "fencing out" citizens
who are otherwise qualified to vote because of the manner in which they
might vote. No intention had been made or shown that people who live
in Ohio less than a year tend to vote in the same manner. Also, the court
classified the types of voting cases and noted that the compelling state in-
terest test had not been applied across the board to all voting cases. One
judge dissented on a theory similar to Justice Marshall's dissent in Hall.
During the last half of 1970, the voter residency laws of seven states
were held unconstitutional by three judge district courts.85 Contrary to the
Ohio opinions, these courts adopted the reasoning of Justice Marshall in
his dissenting opinion in Hall. The reasoning of these opinions is very
similar. They express the view that the Constitution protects the right to
vote, and this right is fundamental. After this conclusion, it was only
necessary to determine the standard, whether rational or compelling, to
measure the condition on suffrage. After an examination of the Supreme
Court decisions of the 1960's, the overall trend indicated that the compel-
ling state interest test had replaced the rational relation test. Upon apply-
ing this test, the courts determined that the states had no compelling in-
terest to protect by using residency laws. However, this issue has not
been conclusively resolved.
States generally contend that there is need for a durational residency
requirement in order to afford protection from fraudulent voting and dual
voting. There is no doubt that the requirement is rationally related to the
end of having a pure electorate, but there is no compelling interest. In
82 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (M.D. Tenn., 1970), jurisdiction noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Mar.
1, 1971) (No. 769).
83315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970)
(No. 811).
84319 F. Supp. 862, 866 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
85 See note 45 supra.
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many states residency is established by oath, therefore, the durational re-
quirement affords no protection from the liar. Furthermore, the state can
uphold its interest by a less restrictive qualification such as registration
which could require a declaration of intent to remain in the state. Ohio's
anti-fraud statutes could deter false declaration of intent by subjecting the
violators to a fine from $50-$1000 or one to three years in prison.8" An-
other interest contended by the states is administrative simplicity. Al-
though there may be a rational relationship to this contention, the state's
own actions dispell any interest in long durations. For example, Ohio re-
quired only a forty day registration closing period for presidential elec-
tions,8 7 and this requirement has been further reduced by congressional
action.88 Furthermore, Carrington v. Rash89 indicated that administrative
simplicity cannot be a basis for voting restrictions. The states also indicate
that there is need for a durational requirement so that new residents will
have time to gain knowledge of local issues. This contention has been
rejected on the national scale on the basis of modern day communications;
however, this reasoning does not apply to state and local elections. There-
fore, the state may very well have a compelling interest in promoting an
intelligent use of the ballot by imposing residency requirements? 0  How-
ever, it must be remembered that the restriction must be narrowly drawn
so that a state can promote its interest in intelligent use of the ballot in
a less restrictive manner than a blanket denial of the franchise to all new
residents.
Although the new rationale, based on the importance of the right to
vote and expansion of the meaning of the equal protection clause, is very
persuasive, the Supreme Court could easily reject the approach. The Pope
decision provided the states with broad discretion when qualifying electors.
The foundation of this state's right, although narrowed in the last decade,
has not been obliterated. However, the Supreme Court has also indicated
inconsistent positions on the residency issue. This occurred when stays of
the district court's judgments were requested of the Supreme Court in both
Sirak v. Brown"1 and Burg v. Canniffee.92 Both stays were denied even
though Sirak was decided in favor of the state and Burg was decided
against the state's position. However, the most recent voting rights opin-
ion, Oregon v. Mitchell,"3 provides insight as to how the Justices might re-
86 Oso REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.11 (Page 1960).
87id. § 3505.01.
88 See Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201-305, 84 Stat 314 (June 22,
1970).
89 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
90See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51-2 (1959); cf. Oregon v. Mit-
chell, 400 U.S. 112, 242 (1970) (Brennen, J., dissenting and concurring).
91 See note 31 supra.
92 See note 83 supra.
98 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Holding that Congress could fix the age of electors in federal elec-
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act when the state residency issue comes before the Supreme Court. There
are four Justices that would void state voter residency requirements. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall had previously indicated their position in dis-
sent in Hall v. Beals.04 In Mitchell, they were joined by Justice White. In
their dissent on the issue of congressional authority to fix the age of voters
in state elections, they indicated that although the states have wide discre-
tion in establishing voter qualifications, any restriction must undergo a
compelling state interest test.95  Although Justice Douglas does not ex-
plidtly state that the compelling interest test is the governing standard, he
indicates that voting is a civil right. Furthermore, his discussion of recent
voting decisions indicates that the equal protection clause is broad enough
to protect any infringement on this right. 6  The remaining five justices
would hold that the state-federal relationship has not changed in the area
of voter qualifications so that reasonable durational requirements are with-
in the state's authority. Justice Black would uphold the state's power on
the authority of Pope:
No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence
of the States and their governments than the power to determine within
the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for
state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery
for filling local public offices. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904);
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1874).97
Justice Harlan elaborately discussed the history of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Mitchell. His position indicates that the rights of the states can
only be changed by constitutional amendment, therefore, he would not ap-
ply the equal protection clause to state residency requirements. The Chief
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Stewart indicated in a footnote that ques-
tions raised by state voter residency laws are "quite different from those
attending the constitutionality of § 202."98 However, if one equates the
power of the state to establish age qualifications with residency qualifica-
tions, these Justices would not interfere with the power of the states to
make reasonable choices:
To be sure, recent decisions have established that state action regulating
suffrage is not immune from the impact of the Equal Protection Clause.
But we have been careful in those decisions to note the undoubted power
tions but not in state and local elections, that Congress could exercise their power under the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments in or to prohibit the use of literacy tests or other de-
vices used to discriminate against voters on account of their race in both state and local elections,
and that Congress could set residency requirements and provide for absentee balloting in elec-
tions for presidential and vice presidential electors).
94 396 U.S. 45, 51 (1969).
95 400 U.S. 112, 242 (1970).
91 Id. at 140.
971d. at 125.
98 Id. at 292 n.9.
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of a State to establish a qualification for voting based on age. See, e.g.,
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625; Lassiter v. North-
ampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 51. Indeed, none of the opinions
filed today suggest that the States have anything but a constitutionally
unimpeachable interest in establishing some age qualification as such. Yet
to test the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling
interest" standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no
State could demonstrate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with
respect to age at one point rather than another. Obviously, the power to
establish an age qualification must carry with it the power to choose 21 as
a reasonable voting age, as the vast majority of the States have done.99
Therefore, the compelling interest test would not be adopted by a 5-4 vote.
However, the right to travel also is a ground upon which to void state
voter residency laws.
III. VOTER RESIDENCY LAWS AND THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL INTERSTATE
In Hall v. Beals,100 Justice Marshall upon reaching the merits argued
that the residency requirement of Colorado was invalid, and that Dreuding
was no longer good law. His conclusion was based entirely on a voting
rights analysis, that is, that the residency requirement infringed upon the
fundamental right to vote, and therefore, the compelling state interest
test of the equal protection clause was applicable. However, since the
Shapiro v. Thompson0 1 decision, which voided a one year welfare resi-
dency requirement on the basis of an infringement of the fundamental
right to travel interstate, there have also been questions whether the
residency laws of voter registration infringe upon this right to travel and
must undergo the compelling interest test.
As previously mentioned, the Court in Shapiro at footnote twenty-one
made it clear that the conclusion did not invalidate voter residency require-
ments:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence re-
quirements determining eligibility to vote. . . . Such requirements may
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.102
It can be argued therefore, that Shapiro has no relevance to residency re-
quirements related to state elections, since the Court was concerned only
99 Id. at 294-95 (footnotes omitted).
100 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
101 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
102 Id. at 638. See also, Green v. Department of Public Welfare of State of Delaware, 270
F. Supp. 173,178 (D. Del. 1967). There, the court rejected the state's argument that the rea-




with welfare payments. However, this language does not reject the possi-
bility of applying the rationale to later voting cases, because voter residency
requirements may not promote compelling state interests and may very well
be penalties upon the right to travel. Therefore, the reasoning of the de-
cision is important to determine its applicability to voting cases.
The Court in Shapiro found that the welfare benefits of the states had
been denied to eligible applicants solely because they had recently moved
into the state. This was found to be a penalty on travel.
But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.' 0 3
From this reasoning it might be concluded that state interests in voter resi-
dency laws must also undergo the compelling interest test if it can be
shown that the laws inhibit interstate movement. Of course, proving such
a deterence would be a difficult task. However, it would also be difficult
for a court to say that the inability to vote is of no concern to an individ-
ual, particularly if the right to vote is considered a fundamental right under
the Constitution. It has also been suggested that penalty need not connote
a deterence, but rather, if the nature of the deprivation determines whether
a penalty on the right to travel exists, then a residency voting requirement
would constitute a penalty. 04 Furthermore, since a challenge to a voter
residency law would contain an infringement on two fundamental rights,
voting and travel, the reasoning of Aptheker v. Secretary of State'0 5 might
be applied. In that case the petitioner as a potential traveler was com-
pelled to choose between his right to travel and his first amendment free-
doms. As Chief Justice Warren said in explaining his decision in his
dissent in Shapiro: "[ilt was this Hobson's choice, we later explained,
which forms the rationale of Aptheker."'00
Congressional hearings for the Voting Rights Act of 197017 also sup-
port the contention that residency restrictions burden the right of inter-
state travel. Although these findings are worded for federal elections, it
is difficult to rationalize how such a restriction is a burden in one instance
but not another.
The courts that have upheld state residency laws have consistently
stated that these laws do not impinge on the right to travel. In Howe v.
Brown,0 8 the court read Shapiro in the same manner as it had read the
103 Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
104 Note, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. CI. L. REV.
359, 382 (1970).
105 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
100 394 U.S. 618, 649 (1969).
107 See note 88 supra.
108 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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voting cases, that is, the residency requirement must have the effect of
"fencing out" anyone from the state of Ohio. Since no allegation or proof
was offered on the issue, the court could find no infringement. Cocanower
v. Marston19 took a different approach to Shapiro.
[Iln the context of a constitutional right to travel the Court tin Shapiro]
recognized a distinction between state-imposed residency requirements as a
condition to receiving welfare benefits and those durational residency
requirements imposed as a qualification to vote."10
Since Sirak v. Brown"' did not reach the merits, it might be inferred that
the court did not feel Shapiro was relevant to the facts.
Of the several decisions that have voided residency requirements for
voting in state elections, it is interesting to note that only two of them,
Kohn v. Davis"2 and Bufford v. Holton,a have relied on the additional
ground of right to travel. In Kohn, the court viewed the one year resi-
dency requirement of Vermont as a limitation on both the right to travel
and right to vote. In Bufford, the court did not think Virginia proved any
compelling interest in the one year residency requirement:
On the contrary the difference in treatment of residents, regardless of the
State's intendment, is dearly an arbitrary discrimination. To begin with,
this call for residence can without more be seen as an obstruction or deter-
rent to uninhibited interstate travel, admittedly a Constitutional prerog-
ative. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322. A person
might well be unduly postponed in the enjoyment of his vote for an ex-
tortionate period, possibly as much as two years (short of a day) if he
came into Virginia after November in a general election year. The new-
comer may have lost his vote by departure from the former habitat and be
unable to regain it with reasonable promptness in Virginia. 114
Although the interstate movement issue was before some of the other dis-
trict courts, the decisions rested only on the equal protection argument of
this right to vote. Although this issue would be raised before the Supreme
Court in light of voting rights, it is doubtful that the Justices who favor
the state's right position would invalidate voting residency on a right to
travel basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ohio federal district courts upheld Ohio's one year durational resi-
dency requirement for state and local elections. These courts viewed the
Constitution as giving broad powers to the state to determine the qualifi-
109 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970).
110 Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
I See note 31 supra.
112 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970).
i1a 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970).
"14 Id. at 846.
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cations for electors. In other words, the reasoning of Pope and Dreuding
was read with approval. However, the last decade of Supreme Court de-
cisions indicate that the right to vote is now fundamental to our society
since it is preservative of all our rights. Furthermore, there appears to be
a trend not only to continue to subject voting cases to the equal protection
clause, but also to protect suffrage by use of a compelling state interest test
rather than the traditional rational relation standard. However, an exami-
nation of the recent Arizona decision indicates that such reasoning might
not apply to this area of state's rights. Finally, residency requirements
have been held unconstitutional in welfare cases if the requirement in-
fringes on the right to travel. Although this reasoning can be applied to
voting cases, it would be difficult to identify any penalty on travel imposed
by these residency laws. Therefore, it is doubtful state voter residency
statutes would be voided on this ground.
Ronald L. Rowland
